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Abstract:
The paper consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part deals with the normative legitimacy of
political communities, such as states and confederations, in general, i.e. their accept-
ability in light of reasonable standards of efﬁciency, common good, and justice from the
viewpoints of their members on the one hand (internal legitimacy) and their social sur-
roundings on the other (external legitimacy). The requirements of both aspects of legit-
imacy are speciﬁed in a twofold way: as normative ideals and as minimum standards.
As to the latter, a political community’s legitimacy minimally requires that it effectively
guarantees the fundamental human rights of its members and complies with certain ba-
sic precepts of a peaceful and generally beneﬁcial international order. On this basis, the
second part scrutinizes the legitimacy of the European Union with regard to its internal
and external aspects. This attempt leads to a mixed result. Even though the EU can
certainly be regarded, by and large, as a desirable project, it also suffers from a number
of considerable defects that weaken its legitimacy.
1. Introduction
A political community, as conceived of in this paper, is an organised territorial
social union with a sufﬁcient extent of political autonomy to enable it to regu-
late its internal affairs covering important aspects of the life of its members in
a binding way and to dissociate itself from the external social world by exclud-
ing non-members at its discretion. This notion of a political community seems
narrow enough to exclude voluntary political associations, such as political par-
ties, which are of no signiﬁcance in the present context, and also broad enough
to cover a variety of political organisations, such as dukedoms, states, empires,
and confederations, including the European Union.
Political communities are real phenomena of the social world which may be
described as empirical facts as well as results of social action which are subject to
normative evaluation. Accordingly, it is necessary to distinguish between their
actual development on the one hand, and their legitimacy on the other. Usually,
the development of political communities is a complex social process driven by
a variety of causes, including social power struggles revolving around partial310 Peter Koller
interests rather than reasonable arguments. Yet, in whatever way a political
community may actually develop, it needs a sufﬁcient degree of legitimacy in
order to maintain its existence. A political community’s demand for legitimacy
manifests in diverse normative claims which are raised vis-à-vis its order: ﬁrst,
the claim of its representatives and ofﬁcials to the binding force of their deci-
sions; second, the claim of its members and denizens to the appropriateness of
its norms and practices; and, third, the claim of its neighbours and surroundings
to the bearableness of its external effects (see Kliemt 1985).
The concept of legitimacy, however, possesses a notorious ambiguity accord-
ing to which it may be interpreted in a descriptive as well as in a normative
sense. Consequently, the question of the legitimacy of political communities may
take two different forms: on the one hand, the empirical question of whether a
political community is actually accepted by the relevant groups, and, on the
other, the normative question as to the conditions under which a political com-
munity, if at all, appears acceptable for good reasons (cf. Kliemt 1980, 32ff.). In
the following, I am going to deal with the second, normative question from two
perspectives, a general and a particular perspective. First, I want to identify the
general requirements which any political community ought to meet in order to
be deemed legitimate; then, using this as a basis, I will discuss the particular
case of the legitimacy of the European Union.
2. The Legitimacy of Political Communities
2.1 Fundamentals of the Legitimacy of Political Communities
In order to make the subject of my following considerations a bit clearer, I should
point out the fact that descriptive and normative legitimacy, in spite of their
conceptual difference, are interrelated. A political community has actual legit-
imacy, if it ﬁnds acceptance on the part of its members and neighbours that is
sufﬁcient for its long term existence (see Weber 1972, 122ff.). The fundamentals
of this legitimacy are not appropriate normative standards, but the actual beliefs
and attitudes of the community’s ofﬁcials, members and neighbours, regardless
of whether these beliefs appear rational or irrational from a critical viewpoint.
An enlightened public, however, will enter into a reﬂective discourse in order
to scrutinize these beliefs regarding their reasons. As a result, people may be
inclined to adjust their actual beliefs to those which they deem generally accept-
able after careful consideration. This raises the question as to the normative
requirements that a political community has to meet in order to be acceptable
to its members and neighbours. This question is about a community’s normative
legitimacy, its acceptability in the light of reasonable normative standards (see
Kliemt 1985, 223ff.).
The normative standards for the evaluation of social affairs and orders in
general and political communities in particular may be divided into three cat-
egories which, by and large, run parallel to Kant’s well-known distinction be-On the Legitimacy of Political Communities 311
tween technical, pragmatic, and moral guidelines of human conduct: efﬁciency,
common good, and morality or justice (Koller 2002, 44ff.). Let me explain my
understanding of these concepts brieﬂy.
From the viewpoint of efﬁciency, social affairs, practices and orders are jud-
ged with regard to their utility in the light of the actual preferences of the indi-
viduals concerned in the context of the respective status quo. Although there is
no complete agreement on how individual preferences may be aggregated to a
generally collective preference function, two criteria of social efﬁciency appear
highly plausible and are widely accepted: ﬁrst, the Pareto-Principle, according
to which a social state of affairs is deemed efﬁcient if it cannot be changed in
a way that is to the beneﬁt of at least one of the individuals concerned with-
out thereby worsening the situation of others; and, second, the Kaldor-Hicks-
Principle, which identiﬁes a state of affairs as efﬁcient if this state, compared
with its feasible alternatives, makes some individuals so much better-off that
they could compensate all those who fare worse (Buchanan 1985, 4ff.; Coleman
1988, 67ff.).
In contrast to efﬁciency, the common good is usually conceived of as the col-
lective interest or welfare of a community as a whole rather than a mere aggre-
gate of the utilities of its individual members. Thus, considerations of common
good require an impersonal perspective that abstracts from the actual prefer-
ences of individuals and aims to judge communal practices and projects in the
light of well-considered shared interests of all members, including future gener-
ations. The question as to the standards which may guide these considerations,
however, is pretty controversial and unclear (Koller 2002). Nevertheless, there
seem to exist some widely acknowledged features of a community’s well-being
that may serve as middle-range indicators of common good: its self-assertion
within its social and natural surroundings, and its social cohesion which re-
quires a basic consensus on the main principles of its social order. Admittedly,
these features are very vague and open to various interpretations.
Considerations of morality and justice attempt to judge social affairs, prac-
tices and orders regarding their general acceptability to all people concerned
from an impartial point of view. Thus, the starting point for moral considera-
tions is a presumed initial situation of equal standing (rather than the status
quo), and their measure of evaluation is the generally shared basic interests of
the people concerned, such as their basic needs (rather than their actual pref-
erences). The resulting normative standards may roughly be divided into two
kinds: on the one hand, the precepts of universally binding morality, which
generally apply to all humans vis-à-vis each other, and, on the other hand, the
requirements of justice, which always refer to certain constellations of social in-
teraction and, therefore, generate duties and rights only for those people who
are involved in these constellations. In fact, there is a large variety of such con-
stellations and corresponding demands of justice. In order to illuminate them, it
is helpful to differentiate between various kinds of justice each of which applies
to a particular elementary form of social action. In my opinion, there are good312 Peter Koller
reasons for a classiﬁcation into four different kinds: distributive, contractual,
political, and corrective justice (Koller 2003, 238f.).
Distributive justice applies to social affairs where a number of people have
a common claim to certain goods or a common obligation in view of particu-
lar burdens. Such affairs—let us call them communal relationships—require
a just distribution of the goods or burdens under consideration, a distribution
that is acceptable to all parties involved from an impartial point of view. The
basic demand of distributive justice is that all members of a community ought
to have an equal share of the respective goods and burdens unless there are
generally acceptable reasons for an unequal distribution.—Contractual justice
refers to voluntary exchange relationships, i.e. agreements among independent
individuals on a reciprocal transfer of private goods or services. It demands that
such agreements are to the beneﬁt of all parties involved. This requires fair ex-
change conditions, which particularly include the following: that all parties are
sufﬁciently informed about the relevant facts and capable of rational decision
so that they can pursue their well-considered interests, that the agreements do
not come about through misleading and fraud, and that no party has the power
to dictate the terms of exchange exclusively.—Political justice focuses on power
relationships, i.e. the use of authoritative power backed by force. In order to
be just, such relationships must be in the well-considered interest of all parties,
including the governed, which requires that any authoritative power must be
aimed at legitimate ends and exercised in an impartial way based on general
rules.—Corrective justice is tailored to wrongness relationships, i.e. situations
resulting from a wrongdoing which requires appropriate correction. In general,
there are two types of corrective measures, namely compensation and punish-
ment, each of which is subject to various requirements of proportionality.
It is clear that the three sorts of normative considerations—efﬁciency, com-
mon good, and morality, including justice—are not separate, but different partial
aspects of a comprehensive evaluation of social affairs. This leads to the question
as to how they are related to each other and how they may be combined. This
question is particularly important if the various aspects are in conﬂict rather
than leading to the same results. For such cases, there is a simple rule. It says
that the fundamental requirements of morality and justice have priority over the
common good, and that signiﬁcant needs of common good ought to take prece-
dence over efﬁciency. This rule, which is widely acknowledged in principle, even
though not always easily applicable in practice, can be explained by the fact that
considerations of morality and justice usually have a much weaker motivational
force than the needs of the common good, which themselves are actually often
dominated by the striving for efﬁciency. This order of the different aspects as to
their motivational strength makes it necessary to reverse their normative rank-
ing order. Otherwise morality and justice would remain completely ineffective,
and also the common good would be in a difﬁcult position (cf. Kliemt 1990, 25ff.).
The priority of morality and justice provides me with a good excuse so that, in
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trate on morality and justice. On this point, I now turn to the issue of the moral
requirements that a political community must meet in order to be legitimate.
2.2 Requirements of the Legitimacy of Political Communities
The search for the conditions under which political communities, i.e. their orders
and practices, may be deemed to be legitimate presupposes the idea that the
existence of such communities is not merely an empirical fact, but normatively
acceptable too. This raises the more fundamental question as to the justiﬁcation
of the formation of relatively independent and separate societal communities.
Since I cannot enter into a thorough discussion of this question, I shall restrict
myself to a brief sketch of my position. In my view, the formation of political
communities is a sort of ‘moral division of labour’ which people deploy in order
to cope with problems of collective action, because personally or locally limited
social unions enable them better than unrestricted relationships to establish
social arrangements that effectively enforce individual rights and duties and
facilitate generally beneﬁcial projects of social cooperation (Koller 2007).
Moral division of labour means that people enter into particular social net-
works which endow them with speciﬁc moral rights and duties towards each
other, rights and duties which exceed the fully universal moral precepts that
apply to all individuals regardless of their social relationships. A paradigm case
of such a network is a family whose members owe to each other a much greater
extent of care and support than strangers. So the moral division of labour aims
at supplementing the precepts of universal morality, which cannot demand very
much, with additional and more demanding duties applying to individuals in-
volved in special relationships in order to help them to cope with their exist-
ing problems through mutually beneﬁcial arrangements of social cooperation.
A common and expedient practice for achieving this goal is the formation of
communities which oblige their respective members to mutual solidarity and,
thereby, also dissociate themselves from their social surroundings. Of particular
importance are political communities that differ from other forms of community
by the fact that they dominate most other communities within their territorial
domain due to their far-reaching powers of compulsory regulation of social af-
fairs. Understood in this way, the plurality of separate political communities,
into which the social world is divided, is not illegitimate per se, but may even
be required from a moral point of view (Koller 2001). This thesis, however, does
not imply that all actually existing political communities are legitimate. Their
normative legitimacy depends on more substantial requirements.
In this context, I would like to emphasize again that a political community’s
legitimacy has two sides: an internal and an external side. A community’s in-
ternal legitimacy is the acceptability of its basic order to its members. I assume
that, today, it is widely agreed on that a political community, in order to be ac-
ceptable to its members, has to satisfy the requirements of efﬁciency, common
good, and justice at least to a certain extent, even though the interpretation of
these requirements may greatly diverge. By contrast, the external legitimacy of314 Peter Koller
a political community is the defensibility of its practices vis-à-vis its social sur-
roundings, particularly other political communities and their members. How-
ever, the question as to whether political communities, especially states, require
external legitimation is a contested issue. Even though most authors seem to
be inclined to take an afﬁrmative position, there are still some advocates of ‘in-
ternational realism’ who think that the external behaviour of states is neither
capable nor in need of any normative justiﬁcation (cf. Donelly 1992). I want
to plead for a differentiated moralism, which, in principle, afﬁrms the need for
an external legitimation of political communities within certain limits (cf. Lord
2005).
I just want to mention two reasons for the contention that states, with re-
gard to their behaviour towards other nations, are subject to certain demands of
morality and justice. First of all, when we look at the real practice of political
discourse, it turns out that political communities are usually judged not merely
with regard to their internal affairs, but also in view of the external effects of
their practices, even though the evaluations of their members often differ from
those of the outsiders. For example, the rulers of a state who wage a war against
another state habitually justify this step by arguing that it was not only nec-
essary to protect their country’s legitimate interests, but also provoked through
the aggressive behaviour on the part of the other state. Likewise, those who con-
demn a state that wages a war usually accuse its rulers not only of the sacriﬁces
they impose on their own population, but also of the fact that they violate the
legitimate interests of the opposing nation. Secondly, it appears obvious that a
state of nature in the international sphere, i.e. a state of permanent strife and
insecurity resulting from an anarchical system of sovereign states, is a great
moral evil which ought to be counteracted as far as possible through an effective
international order. Even though the voice of morality is certainly not strong
enough to initiate such an order, it is indispensable, since morality and justice
are needed to articulate the ideal of a peaceful and just world as a guideline for
endeavours to achieve a better global order. Moralising international politics,
however, has certain limits too. In my view, it cannot be reasonably expected
of a nation to comply with demands of international morality and justice that
would be binding under the ideal condition of their general compliance, if, by
doing so, this nation would have to sacriﬁce its fundamental interests, such as
its interests of self-preservation and self-assertion against international compe-
tition (cf. Buchanan 2004).
On the basis of these considerations, I want to formulate the moral require-
ments of the legitimacy of political communities in a ﬁrst approximation quite
generally as follows: A political community is normatively legitimate, if and in-
sofar as its essential rules, institutions, and practices, scrutinized from an im-
partial viewpoint, are (i) internally acceptable in the sense that they are to be
accepted by each member as binding, and (ii) externally defensible in the sense
that they cannot be reasonably rejected as impermissible by the community’s
social surroundings. Since these requirements can be met to varying degrees,
they are to be understood not as strict conditions, but rather as regulative ideas,On the Legitimacy of Political Communities 315
on the basis of which a political community may be judged as more or less le-
gitimate or illegitimate. Of course, one’s judgement will highly depend on one’s
understanding of the requirements, which, admittedly, are pretty vague and ab-
stract. In order to explain my own understanding brieﬂy, I am going to propose
two possible interpretations of each requirement: ﬁrst, a highly demanding in-
terpretation as a normative ideal, and, second, a much weaker interpretation as
a minimum standard.
A political community’s internal acceptability requires that its basic rules,
institutions and practices are in the well-considered interest of all members. In
other words, a political community is internally acceptable if its order appears
better or at least not signiﬁcantly worse for each of its members than any fea-
sible alternative when considered from an informed and impartial viewpoint.
I assume that such an order, in the ideal case, would have to accord with all
plausible principles of efﬁciency, common good, and morality, including the fun-
damental demands of social justice, namely legal equality, civil liberty, demo-
cratic participation, equal opportunity, and economic equity (Koller 2003). As I
interpret these demands, they cannot easily be met. In fact, most political com-
munities, including presently existing states, do not even come close to them.
Anyway, since it does not make much sense to raise the threshold of legitimacy
to such a high level that it never will be met, it appears necessary to weaken
the requirement to a degree that can be demanded realistically. I think there
is one plausible and widely acknowledged minimum standard that any political
community ought to satisfy in order to be legitimate: it must effectively guar-
antee the fundamental human rights of its members, including their social and
economic rights (see Kliemt 1988; 1995, 75ff.).
The external defensibility of a political community means that its practices
appear to be tolerable for other communities and their members. This requires
that these practices do not have negative external effects that appear impermis-
sible in consideration of the interests of all people concerned from an impartial
point of view. So a community’s practices must be generalisable in the sense that
they appear generally acceptable, even if they were adopted by all communities.
I assume that this requirement, in its ideal interpretation, implies the follow-
ing demands of international justice: respect for the equal political autonomy of
other nations to the extent that such autonomy appears generally possible; par-
ticipation in impartial international institutions which, as far as possible, work
to ensure the peaceful resolution of international conﬂicts and the protection of
human rights all over the world; compliance with the principles of fair trade
so that all nations can derive appropriate beneﬁt from international markets;
and limitation of the consumption of natural resources to an extent that is com-
patible with their sustainable use to the beneﬁt of all people, including future
generations. In reality, however, we have become accustomed to the fact that
all these requirements are frequently neglected by virtually all nations, if they
are able to do so. Nevertheless, I suppose, most people would agree that a na-
tion that wants to be acknowledged by others as legitimate has to comply with
some minimum standards, including the following: it must not pursue a foreign316 Peter Koller
policy that qualiﬁes as colonialist or imperialist, not promote or support foreign
governments that excessively violate the human rights of their denizens, and
not make use of extremely unfair practices of international trade at the expense
of other people.
So much for the requirements of legitimacy of political communities. Even
if my sketch may have provoked more questions than it has provided answers,
it should give an approximate impression of my approach to political legitimacy.
So I hope that it provides a sufﬁcient basis for my following attempt to scrutinize
the legitimacy of the European Union.
3. Legitimation Problems of the European Union
3.1 The Internal Legitimacy of the European Union
In this context, it is neither possible nor necessary to recapitulate the develop-
ment of the European Union (see Arndt 2066, 9ff.; Cini 2007, 13ff.). In order to
avoid any misunderstanding, however, I would like to mention that I am using
the term European Union (EU) not in its strictly legal sense, but, in accordance
with ordinary language, in the broad sense which refers to the entire system of
cooperation among European states that has developed since the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 with all its regulations,
institutions, and procedures (see Arndt 2006, 2).
The project of European integration derives its enduring attractiveness and
gravity mainly from two driving forces that, by and large, operate in harmony:
These forces are, on the one hand, the manifest interest of the countries involved
in taking beneﬁt from the establishment of a common market, and, on the other,
the noble ambition to overcome the traditional rivalry and often bloody con-
ﬂicts among European nations through a stable order of peaceful cooperation.
Both motives already appear in the Paris Treaty of 1951, whose preamble de-
clares that the contracting parties were “convinced that the contribution which
an organised and vital Europe can make to civilisation is indispensable to the
maintenance of peaceful relations”, and that, furthermore, they were “anxious
to help, by expanding their basic production, to raise the standard of living and
further the works of peace”, ﬁnally resolving “to create, by establishing an eco-
nomic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples
long divided by bloody conﬂicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which
will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared”. This declaration, if taken
seriously, is a paradigm case of the justiﬁcation of a political community that
accords to the requirements of legitimacy previously mentioned, covering both
the internal and the external aspect.
In the course of its ongoing widening and deepening, the EU has successively
set itself more far-reaching goals, that may roughly be divided into two sorts: po-
litical and economic objectives. The political objectives include in particular the
maintenance of peace, the preservation of liberty, democracy, and the rule ofOn the Legitimacy of Political Communities 317
law, the protection of human rights, cooperation in combating criminality, and
the striving for a common foreign and security policy. Among the constantly ex-
panding number of the EU’s economic objectives we ﬁnd, without regard to their
chronological and systematic order, the following: establishing a free trade sys-
tem, preserving rural regions, creating a single economic market, achieving a
harmonious and sustainable development of all member countries, stimulating
employment, ensuring sufﬁcient social security, enforcing gender equality, fos-
tering economic growth, increasing the competitiveness of Europe vis-à-vis other
developed regions, protecting the environment, safeguarding the quality of life
and social cohesion, fostering friendship and solidarity among European peo-
ples, and promoting education and research (cf. Urwin 2007; Phinemore 2007).
Unlike previous forms of large political communities, whose emergence was
almost always driven forward by means of military force, the community of Eu-
ropean states has come about exclusively through voluntary contractual agree-
ments concluded by the participating states in their own well-considered inter-
est. A further signiﬁcant novelty is the openness of the EU to all European coun-
tries that meet the economic, political, and legal prerequisites of membership.
Up until now, the EU has demonstrated a remarkable capability for adjusting
its institutional system to the growing demands of regulation resulting from its
widening and deepening. Through a sequence of fundamental treaties, such as
the Treaties of Rome (1957), the Treaty of Brussels (1965), the Single European
Act (1986), the Treaties of Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2001),
and, perhaps, the recent Treaty of Lisbon (2007), it has developed a rather com-
plex system of institutions and procedures that is certainly not perfect, but, by
and large, rather effective. An important part of this system, for example, is
the European Court of Justice which has taken the role of a rather powerful in-
dependent guardian of European law; and there is also some prospect that the
European Parliament may develop into a stronger democratic counterweight to
the European Council and the Commission. Last but not least, the entire system
appears to be based on principles which, in theory, appear well-founded, such as
the principle of subsidiarity as a guide-line for the division of responsibilities
among the EU and its member states, and the supremacy of the Community law
over national law that warrants the legal unity of the EU (Holzinger et al. 2005,
19ff.; Arndt 2006, 41ff.; Cini 2007, 137ff.).
In consideration of these facts, it is fair to regard the EU as a highly suc-
cessful venture of political community formation. In my opinion, its most signif-
icant merits with regard to its internal affairs lie in the following policy areas:
(a) peace, human rights and security, (b) economic integration and market or-
der, and (c) culture and identity. For the sake of brevity, I shall just recount
what I deem to be the main merits of the EU in a shorthand fashion.—Peace,
human rights and security: The EU has developed an effective system of peace-
ful conﬂict resolution among its members through procedures that combine the
search for compromises with binding decision-making; it has improved the hu-
man rights by obliging its member states to comply with the European Con-
vention of Human Rights; it has created a common citizenship that grants all318 Peter Koller
citizens a number of rights, including the right to free movement throughout the
Union; it has diminished the previous economic inequalities among its member
countries through the single market as well as redistributive measures; and it
also has taken successful steps to improve law enforcement and criminal prose-
cution by strengthening its system of Police and Judicial Co-operation in Crim-
inal Matters (Arndt 2006, 141ff.; Greer 2006, 47ff.).—Economic integration and
market order: The EU has been greatly successful in creating a single mar-
ket whose well-known four freedoms (goods, workers, capital, and services) in-
crease competition and thereby stimulate economic efﬁciency and growth; and it
has issued a largely effective order of market competition that, by and large, is
equally enforced in all member states (Arndt 2006, 179ff.; Egan 2007).—Culture
and identity: The EU has made great efforts to promote and strengthen the
awareness of a common European culture and identity through arranging and
supporting contact, exchange programs and cooperative networks among citi-
zens of different European countries on many levels; and it has facilitated the
emergence of a European civil society by stimulating an enormous proliferation
of associations and networks among people from all over Europe concerned with
manifold political, economic, social, and cultural issues (McLaren 2007).
These achievements, however, should not blind us to the fact that the EU, as
far as its internal legitimacy is concerned, does suffer from signiﬁcant deﬁcits too
(see Follesdal 2005). These include some control deﬁcits, the well-known demo-
cratic deﬁcit, and, in my opinion even more important, a gross social deﬁcit.
Since these shortcomings have been extensively discussed in public, I may re-
strict myself to a brief summary.
Control deﬁcits: The efﬁcient functioning of the institutional system of the
EU has been increasingly weakened through its successive widening, because
its central institutions, particularly the European Council and the Commission,
have gradually been impaired in their capability of decision-making by the grow-
ing number of member states. In this respect, the EU has actually become too
large already. After the failure of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Eu-
rope and the current set-back of the Lisbon Treaty, it remains an open question
as to whether the EU will be able to achieve a new institutional arrangement
which may cope with this problem. On the other hand, however, the EU also ap-
pears too small in face of the growing political challenges that have resulted from
the ongoing process of globalisation, such as the destruction of the natural envi-
ronment in general and global warming in particular, the worldwide migration
streams, and the decline in wages, working conditions and social services result-
ing from international economic competition. In view of these challenges, the
EU will have to increase its willingness to join suitable forms of international
cooperation and global governance that may be capable of dealing with such
matters. Apart from these major control deﬁcits, the EU may also be blamed
for some minor failures of its internal politics, such as its tendency for exces-
sive regulation in order to standardize the markets of goods and services, while
it has been largely ineffective in setting uniform standards in the spheres of
labour, social security, and taxation. An especially horriﬁc example is the Euro-On the Legitimacy of Political Communities 319
pean agricultural policy which is not only absurd from the viewpoint of economic
efﬁciency, but also ecologically problematic and indefensible in the international
context. There is some hope, however, that this policy will be changed in the
near future.
Democratic deﬁcit: The debate about this issue is so wide-spread that it will
sufﬁce to recall the major concerns. One is that the EU is too distant from its
citizens in the sense that its decision-making processes are not subject to an
informed and critical public discussion, and its institutions are doing too little
to convey its decisions and activities to the citizens. Another, closely related
point maintains that the unequal strength of the lobbies who exert an inﬂuence
on the EU institutions behind the scenes lead to a biased preference for the in-
terests of enterprises, business-people, and well-off groups in comparison with
those of workers and ordinary people. Furthermore, there is the complaint that
the division of powers among the European Commission and the Parliament is
highly unbalanced at the expense of democratic participation, so that the popu-
lace has little reason to pay attention to the Parliament and is even discouraged
from being committed to European politics at all. Insofar as these concerns are
true, which they certainly are to a certain degree, one may wonder whether it
is possible to cope with the democratic deﬁcit of the EU through a reform of its
institutions alone, without the existence of a strong European civil society that,
as a critical public, seems to be necessary in order to make democracy work on
the European level (see Follesdal 2006; Holzinger et al. 2005, 89ff.; Eising 2007;
Chryssochoou 2007; Haller 2008).
Social deﬁcit: In my view, the most signiﬁcant shortcoming of the present
stage of the European integration is the discrepancy between the highly ad-
vanced development of the common market on the one hand, and the insuf-
ﬁcient cooperation in the spheres of social security, labour law and tax policy
on the other. Whereas the member states have always succeeded in agreeing
on the steps leading to a single market, such as the opening of their national
economies, the liberalisation of economic competition, the privatisation of public
companies, the standardisation of their ﬁnance policies, and the establishment
of a common currency, they have been greatly ineffective in issuing binding mini-
mum standards concerning the protection of workers, social security and taxation
(Holzinger et al. 2005, 181ff.; Giubbione 2006; Falkner 2007). Consequently, the
member states have been exposed to an intensifying struggle to maintain the
competitiveness of their national economies, which has not only weakened the
position of employees and minor business people, but also undermined the ﬁnan-
cial basis of national social security systems. As a result, the large companies
have achieved rapidly growing proﬁts, that have lead to an enormous increase of
income for well-off groups, particularly investors and managers, while the lower
classes, such as workers, employees, and many ordinary people, have experi-
enced signiﬁcant losses through their shrinking real incomes, the weakening
of workers’ rights, the diminishing bargaining-power of trade unions, the re-
duction of social transfer payments and public services, the social exclusion of
low-qualiﬁed people, and the failing integration of immigrants (Attac 2006).320 Peter Koller
Even though these results do not provide a sufﬁcient reason for denying the
internal legitimacy of the EU, they do necessitate a critical assessment of its past
development to the effect that both its institutional order and its real practice
call for correction. Now, I want to take a glance at its external performance.
3.2 The External Legitimacy of the European Union
Let me ﬁrst recap the declared aims of the EU as to its external policy and its
role in international affairs. In this context, it is useful to differentiate between
two aspects: its general foreign and security policy on the one hand, and its
commercial and trade policy on the other. As to its general foreign and secu-
rity policy, the EU has always understood itself as an expanding peace project
which, due to its efforts to strengthen liberty, legality and democracy in Europe,
is intended to guarantee security and stability on the continent, and, thereby,
contribute to global peace. More demanding objectives of foreign security pol-
icy have been beyond its reach, because it has lacked both the powers and the
means for pursuing them. At the time being, however, there are growing ten-
dencies to strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, its
second pillar, which is mainly directed towards achieving the following objec-
tives: to safeguard the common values and fundamental interests of the Union,
to strengthen both its own security and international security, to promote inter-
national cooperation, to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and
respect for human rights (Howorth 2005; Arndt 2006, 309ff.; Dover 2007).
In contrast to its weakness in matters of foreign security policy, the EU plays
a major role in the sphere of foreign commercial and trade policy, because it
does not only obligate its member states to a Common Commercial and Trade
Policy, but also represent them in these matters on the international level. In
general, the trade policy of the EU has been devoted to the objective of driv-
ing forward the liberalisation of international trade and global markets through
bilateral and multilateral agreements. So the EU is a very important player
in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), where it is responsible for negotiating
the international trading rules concerning goods (GATT), services (GATS), and
intellectual property (TRIPs) on behalf of its member states (see Meunier and
Nicolaides 2005). A main objective of the EU’s declared foreign trade policy is to
promote the economic development of poor countries through their preferential
treatment. Accordingly, it has issued a number of special programs concerning
trade with developing countries. One of them is the so-called Generalised System
of Preferences (GSP) that aims to facilitate the import of particular goods from
developing countries through a non-reciprocal reduction of tariffs. Furthermore,
the EU supports the export of medicines to poor countries in order to make these
goods available to their denizens at affordable prices, while its program Every-
thing But Arms (EBA) limits the arms trade with those countries. Last but not
least, the EU has declared it will submit its external trade to the consideration of
social acceptability, environmental responsibility, and sustainable development
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All these goals of the EU’s foreign policy, including its foreign trade policy,
appear defensible, as far as their form is concerned. They may even be taken
as a model of how the justiﬁcation of the external legitimacy of a large political
community should look. And when the external policy of the EU is judged in
the light of its real effects on the international order, it also seems to deserve a
positive assessment. Its most important achievement is the fact that it has con-
tributed signiﬁcantly to the maintenance of world peace and the international
protection of human rights. For example, there are good reasons to believe that,
in the time of the Cold War, the EU was an important factor for the political
stability of Western Europe, which itself was a precondition of the fact that a
hot war could be prevented. In sum, there are at least three points that can
be put forward for the merits of the EU in international affairs: ﬁrst, its enor-
mous attractiveness which has encouraged a great number of European states
to transform their national political orders to democracy and the rule of law in
order to qualify for the membership of the EU; second, its exemplariness as a
successful model of regional integration of states, which provides a promising
perspective also for other regions in the world; and, third, its important contri-
bution to the protection of human rights as a result of the fact that the EU has
obligated its member states to the compliance with the European Convention of
Human Rights (Linklater 2005; Merli 2007).
Apart from these points, the EU plays a relatively useful role within the con-
temporary international system. As an “economic giant, political dwarf and mil-
itary worm” (Edwards 2005, 61), it is highly immune to imperialist ambitions,
while at the same time representing a certain counterweight to other global
powers that tend towards a more aggressive pursuit of their national interests.
Furthermore, it must be admitted that, in the context of the present interna-
tional system, the EU by and large is a cooperative and reliable party that is not
only committed to constructive participation in many international and global
institutions, but also willing to take part in new forms of transnational politics
in order to cope with urgent problems facing humankind, such as the Interna-
tional Court of Criminal Justice (Hill and Smith 2005, 388ff.; Holzinger et al.
2005, 215ff.).
On the other hand, however, the foreign policy of the EU also includes a
number of negative features which diminish its claim to external legitimacy to a
certain extent. The most problematic area is its commercial and trade policy vis-
à-vis poor countries, that makes a mockery of its declared objective to support
the economic development of these countries through their preferential treat-
ment. In reality, its commercial relationships with developing regions greatly
deviate from this objective: Like other wealthy regions, such as the USA and
Japan, the EU has pursued mainly the interests of its own economy without
caring about the legitimate interests of developing countries. I shall illustrate
this assessment by a few exemplary observations, since I cannot discuss the
matter in detail.
The questionable practice of the EU’s foreign commercial and trade policy is
clearly manifest in the context of the present world trade system. This system322 Peter Koller
is based on various sorts of international agreements which include, on the one
hand, bilateral agreements among individual states, and, on the other, multilat-
eral agreements in the context of the WTO, such as GATT, GATS, and TRIPs.
I shall restrict myself to the latter. Even though the WTO grants each mem-
ber state an equal vote, it is characterised by considerable differences of power
between rich and poor nations resulting from their unequal means for represen-
tation, expertise, and lobbying. Accordingly, the economic superpowers, such as
the USA and the EU, have much more inﬂuence on both the rules of interna-
tional trade and the decision-making processes within the WTO than develop-
ing countries have. Due to this fact, the superpowers have succeeded in urging
the developing countries to open their national markets for imports, while they
themselves have maintained a number of arbitrary practices of protectionism,
such as prohibitive tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers for ﬁnished products and
manufactured goods from developing regions, as well as enormous subsidies for
their own exports to developing countries (see Jackson 1997, 247ff.). That the
EU has achieved a great mastery in using such practices has been revealed by a
detailed inquiry by Oxfam International, which shows that, in the light of a Dou-
ble Standard Index comprising ten criteria, the EU shields its market against
imports from developing countries even more than any other rich nation, includ-
ing the USA (Oxfam 2002, 95ff.).
As a result, the present world trading system operates to the beneﬁt of the
European economy, while it inﬂicts gross harm on the poor regions of the world.
For it provides open access to their markets for European ﬁrms, while getting
the national economies of the poorer nations into trouble, because the ﬂoods of
cheap imports from Europe, supported by the EU through signiﬁcant subsidies,
are ruining the agricultural and industrial producers in poor countries. Further-
more, the EU’s prohibitive tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers against the im-
port of manufactured and ﬁnished products are preventing poor countries from
developing their economies to a more advanced stage, so that they are forced
to stick with selling raw materials and semi-ﬁnished products for little proﬁt.
Consequently, this system is a major cause of the fact that most of the world’s
poorest regions gain little beneﬁt from the liberalisation of global markets or are
even losing out because of it (Oxfam 2002, 64ff.; Küblböck and Strickner 2006).
There are also various complaints about further aspects of the European ex-
ternal economic policy which I can recount here in a shorthand fashion only:
One complaint concerns the dubious role of the EU and its member states in
the global ﬁnance institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank, whose lending conditionalities, devoted to the idea of free mar-
kets, often lead to disastrous effects on the economic and social development in
borrowing countries because their governments, in order to comply with those
conditionalities, are forced to take rigid cost-cutting measures in the provision
of public goods on the one hand, and to open their markets for foreign compa-
nies on the other (Stiglitz 2002; 2003). Another criticism emphasizes Europe’s
share of the responsibility for the hopeless debt crisis from which many poor
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system that the wealthy nations manage in their own interest (Hertz 2004).
Furthermore, one may also highlight the fact that all wealthy regions, includ-
ing Europe, are causing considerable harm to poor peoples trough their wasteful
use of environmental resources without paying them appropriate compensation
(Wuppertal Institut 2005). The EU can also be accused of its unwillingness to
take sufﬁcient measures against the often scandalous and exploitative practices
of transnational companies of European origin in developing countries (Oxfam
2002, 175ff.). And perhaps, one should not forget the hostile and humiliating
treatment to which the EU submits the citizens of its Eastern neighbour coun-
tries when they want to enter its territory.
4. Conclusion
My reﬂections on the legitimacy of the European Union lead to a mixed result.
If the EU is judged against the background of the requirements of internal and
external legitimacy mentioned in the ﬁrst part, it can certainly be regarded, by
and large, as a desirable and legitimate, perhaps even requisite form of political
community building. Yet, the EU also contains a number of considerable deﬁcits
that undermine its legitimacy. Its internal legitimacy is particularly weakened
through the growing social and economic inequalities that result from a biased
politics of market liberalisation that is not backed by a supporting social policy.
And the EU’s external legitimacy is diminished through its unfair practices in its
commercial and economic relationships with developing countries at the expense
of the global poor.
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